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DUNCAN MCCARGO
Cambodia in 2013
(No) Country for Old Men?
ABSTRACT
Cambodia in 2013 was dominated by close-fought national elections on July 28, only
narrowly won by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party after an unexpectedly strong
showing by the opposition. Generational change was a major theme of the year, seen
in the growing activism of youth and the deaths of several prominent figures.
KEYWORDS: Cambodia, elections, urbanized villagers, monarchy
THE YEAR 2013 BEGAN IN CAMBODIA on a somber note, as preparations
gathered pace for the elaborate funeral of former King Norodom Sihanouk in
early February. Sihanouk’s passing in October 2012, just short of his 90th
birthday, not only marked the end of an era stretching back to colonial times;
it also meant the end of the Cambodian monarchy as an independent locus of
power, capable of mediating between conﬂicting politicians. Sihanouk’s cho-
sen successor, his unmarried and heirless son Sihamoni (age 60), has strug-
gled to assert his authority and relevance since being crowned in 2004.
During 2013, that relevance was to be repeatedly tested. In the event, the
ﬁnal phase of Sihanouk’s funeral was not attended by the anticipated one
million mourners, partly because the government sealed off the area around
the Royal Palace to curtail the numbers taking part.1 These moves illustrated
long-serving Prime Minister Hun Sen’s apparent determination further to
undercut the standing of the monarchy and to concentrate power in his own
hands.
DUNCAN MCCARGO is Professor of Southeast Asian Politics, University of Leeds, U.K., and Senior
Research Afﬁliate, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. He thanks his assistants
and informants in Cambodia, as well as Joseph Liow, Ann Marie Murphy, Eastina Tan, and Kheang
Un. Email: <d.j.mccargo@leeds.ac.uk>.
1. ‘‘King Sihanouk’s Funeral Procession,’’ CNN, February 1, 2013, <http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/
DOC-918818>; ‘‘Norodom Sihanouk’s Glorious Goodbye,’’ Phnom Penh Post, February 6, 2013.
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Death also stalked Case 002, the trial of former Khmer Rouge regime
leaders held under the auspices of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid international tribunal.2 Former Foreign
Minister Ieng Sary died in March, aged 87, leaving only two remaining
defendants: Nuon Chea (87) and Khieu Samphan (82). Ieng Sary’s wife Ieng
Thirith (81), originally the fourth defendant in the case, was discharged in
September 2012 on the grounds of mental incapacity to stand trial. Khieu
Samphan’s legendary lawyer Jacques Verge`s died in Paris in August 2013,
himself aged 88. The resignation of International Co-Prosecutor Andrew
Cayley in September was another blow for the beleaguered Tribunal, which
had been beset by funding problems, strike actions by its national staff, and
tense relations between the U.N. and the Cambodian government over the
prospects for further indictments of prominent Khmer Rouge ﬁgures. After
closing statements in Case 002/1 (the segment of Case 002 dealing primarily
with widespread forced evacuations under the Khmer Rouge) were held in
October, the future of the ECCC was unclear; some argued that if these
elderly defendants were convicted in the ﬁrst segment of the case, there was
little to be gained by continuing the process.
Many elements from King Sihanouk’s ceremony were adapted shortly
afterward for the lavish funeral of Hun Sen’s father, Hun Neang, who also
died at the age of 89.3 Regional leaders including Vietnamese Prime Minister
Nguyen Tan Dung and former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
both traveled to Cambodia to pay their respects on July 12. The demise of
Hun Sen’s father so close to the 2013 general election was widely deemed
inauspicious for the ruling party.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
The year’s politics centered around the general election held on July 28.
Cambodian elections since 1993 have frequently been mired in controversy,
but given the strong showing of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)
in both the 2008 general election and the 2012 commune elections, the CPP
was widely expected to win comfortably in 2013. International bodies such as
the EU decided not to send teams of election observers, in part because they
2. For detailed updates and analyses on the progress of the Tribunal, see <http://www.cambodia
tribunal.org/> and <http://krtmonitor.org/>.
3. Cambodia Daily, July 19, 2013.
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were reluctant to rubber-stamp a foregone conclusion. But in the event, the
election proved dramatically illustrative of seismic changes in Cambodian
society that are sure to have lasting ramiﬁcations.
Just two days after Hun Neang was carried to his ﬁnal resting place, the
streets of Phnom Penh were again crowded with well-wishers. This time
hundreds of thousands of people turned out to greet veteran opposition
leader Sam Rainsy, who returned to Cambodia from exile just in time for
the ﬁnal week of campaigning.4 Acting on Hun Sen’s instructions, King
Sihamoni had granted Rainsy a royal pardon, but he was not permitted to
register as a candidate. The election proved a standoff between just two
parties, the CPP—in effect the dominant power group since 1979—and the
Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), led by former Finance Minister
Rainsy. CNRP was formed in 2012, the result of a merger between the
eponymous Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party led by Kem
Sokha. In 2008 the two parties had gained 26 and three seats, respectively,
in the 123-member National Assembly, dwarfed by the CPP’s 90 seats.
While urban dwellers generally favored the opposition, the CPP appeared
to have built up a bedrock of support in rural areas, especially in the lowland
provinces around Phnom Penh, which had beneﬁted from rapid economic
growth over the past two decades. Both parties campaigned on the basis that
Cambodia was a nation of farmers. As in previous elections, the CPP invoked
the legacy of January 7, 1979, the day on which the Khmer Rouge was
removed from power. In his speeches, Hun Sen stressed that the CPP had
brought peace, order, and development to the country, asserting that the only
alternative to CPP rule was a return to civil war. Hun Sen had previously
indicated that he intended to remain prime minister until 2026.
By contrast, the CNRP sought to ‘‘rescue’’ Cambodia from the clutches of
the CPP. As ever, Sam Rainsy invoked ethnically charged rhetoric about yuon
(the inﬂuence of the Vietnamese) designed to highlight the CPP’s close ties
with Hanoi.5 But the CNRP also announced a seven-point populist
4. ‘‘Supporters Mob Cambodia’s Opposition Leader Sam Rainsy on Return from Exile,’’
Guardian, July 19, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/19/cambodia-opposition-
leader-rainsy-return-exile>.
5. See Kheang Un, ‘‘The Cambodian People Have Spoken,’’ New York Times, August 9, 2013,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/10/opinion/global/the-cambodian-people-have-spoken.html?_
r¼1&>.
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manifesto, pledging to raise wages for both workers and government employ-
ees and to reduce the price of basic goods such as oil, fertilizer, and electricity.
In Phnom Penh, both parties mobilized young people to front their cam-
paigns: banner-waving youths on motorbikes cruised the city in packs, espe-
cially in the evenings, while the CPP stationed groups of chanting students at
key locations, especially near the Independence Monument.6 Woe betide any
passers-by sporting opposition logos: they were pulled over and their CNRP
stickers torn off. While the CPP campaign was well-equipped and funded—
most of those taking part were paid—CNRP activists were overwhelmingly
volunteers. The CNRP campaigned using the simple refrain ‘‘Change!’’
(Do!), leaving the CPP to respond rather lamely, ‘‘No Change!’’ (Min Do!).
Non-governmental organization (NGO) leader Ou Virak described the CPP
campaign as ‘‘weak, robotic and heartless’’ compared with the more impas-
sioned and spontaneous electioneering of the CNRP.7 But the same paradox
afﬂicted both campaigns: kids out on the streets, dancing and cheering
beneath images of old men. Most CPP posters featured the jaded triumvirate
of Chea Sim (80), Hun Sen (60), and Heng Samrin (79), while those of the
CNRP depicted Sam Rainsy (64) clasping hands with Kem Sokha (60). For
all the fac¸ade of youth, this was a campaign featuring lots of aging faces and
well-worn themes.
Neither party seemed really to grasp the changing dynamics of the elec-
torate. While most Cambodians nominally live in rural areas, villagers of
working age often spend much of the year selling their labor in and around
Phnom Penh, in neighboring Thailand, or even further aﬁeld. Although they
vote in the countryside, they live and work in cities, and their dreams and
aspirations are almost entirely urban. These ‘‘urbanized villagers’’ feel no debt
of gratitude to the CPP for having developed the nation,8 and the 70% of the
population aged under 30 have no memories of the collective renewal fol-
lowing the 1975–79 Khmer Rouge era. They were repelled by the emotion-
alism of slogans such as ‘‘If You Love/If You Pity/If You Like/If You Trust/
6. This and the following paragraphs are based on the author’s ﬁeldnotes, Phnom Penh, July
21–28, 2013.
7. Author interview with Ou Virak, president of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights,
Phnom Penh, July 23, 2013.
8. For the ﬁrst coinage of this term, see Naruemon Thabchumpon and Duncan McCargo,
‘‘Urbanized Villagers in the 2010 Thai Redshirt Protests: Not Just Poor Farmers?’’ Asian Survey 51:6
(2011), pp. 993–1018.
74  ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
This content downloaded from 128.59.165.146 on Sun, 2 Nov 2014 10:04:17 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hun Sen/Vote CPP,’’ and by the ubiquitous ruling party logos on the villas
and luxury cars of regime beneﬁciaries.
On the eve of the election, hundreds of thousands of people traveled back
from the capital to their villages to vote, the majority ﬁred up for ‘‘change’’
and eager to tell their families and neighbors about the triumphal reception
that greeted Sam Rainsy on his return to Phnom Penh.9 His return, the
biggest political development in Cambodia for many years, was completely
ignored by TV stations, which are all owned either by the government or by
regime cronies. The CPP’s attempts to block coverage of the opposition
backﬁred badly, as people turned for political information increasingly to
alternative and social media, as well as to Radio Free Asia and VOA (Voice of
America).
In the end, however, no party ran the kind of professional election cam-
paign that most other Southeast Asian countries take for granted. The CPP
was expecting to win, while the CNRP was expecting to lose, and their
campaigns reﬂected these assumptions. One prominent NGO leader com-
plained that Sam Rainsy was ‘‘allergic’’ to strategic thinking, expending
energy campaigning in areas such Sihanoukville with virtually no seats to
be won.10 The director of a radio station claimed that neither party had
a well-thought-out media strategy.11 Nevertheless, huge numbers of voters
became passionately engaged with the election, breathing unexpected life into
the process.
The results confounded most pundits. The CPP secured 3,235,969 votes
(49% of the popular vote) and 68 seats, down 22 from the 2008 elections. The
CNRP garnered 2,946,176 votes (44%) and 55 seats, 26 more than the Sam
Rainsy and Human Rights Parties combined in 2008.12 Many prominent
CPP ﬁgures lost their seats, while Hun Sen’s youngest son Hun Many
initially failed to win election, a symbolic blow to the premier’s dynastic
ambitions. The royalist party FUNCINPEC, victors in 1993, failed to gain
a single seat, further evidence of the monarchy’s precipitate decline. Rather
than celebrate the CNRP’s unprecedented successes and seek to maximize
9. Author’s ﬁeldnotes, Kandal and Prey Veng Provinces, July 27–28, 2013.
10. Ou Virak interview. On Sam Rainsy’s ‘‘whirlwind’’ provincial tour, see Cambodia Daily, July
23, 24, and 25, 2013.
11. Author interview with Pa Nhuon Teang, Radio Voice of Democracy, Phnom Penh, July 22,
2013.
12. For full results mapped by province, see <http://electionresults.cambodianvotervoice.org/>.
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their impact, Sam Rainsy immediately rejected the election results, alleging
that over one million names had been removed from voter lists. He appealed
to the U.N. and King Sihamoni to intervene, and announced that the CNRP
would boycott the National Assembly.
Despite these pleas, Sihamoni promptly approved the election results, and
Hun Sen was reappointed prime minister unopposed when the National
Assembly reopened on September 23, 2013. The CNRP responded by orga-
nizing a series of protest rallies and called for the creation of a Truth Com-
mission ‘‘to provide justice to voters.’’ While these rallies passed without
incident, the wisdom of Rainsy’s approach was open to question, since the
international community had a limited appetite for further interventions in
Cambodian politics, and the CPP victory was now a fait accompli.
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
Outwardly, Cambodia’s economy was strong during the year, outperforming
many neighboring countries in the region. Gross domestic product (GDP)
grew by 7.2% in 2012, an improvement on previous years; although exports
fell, domestic consumption rose by 9.5%. Cambodia also beneﬁted from
a surge in foreign direct investment, attracted partly by low wages. Here lay
the rub: gross national income per capita in Cambodia ($880) was much
closer to that of Bangladesh ($840) than to neighboring Laos ($1,260) or
Vietnam ($1,400), let alone Thailand ($5,210).13
Cambodia’s massive income disparities were the Achilles’ heel of the CPP:
senior government ofﬁcials and well-connected business ﬁgures had become
extraordinarily wealthy, leaving the mass of the population far behind.
Linked to these disparities were issues of land-grabbing, endemic corruption,
and ofﬁcial impunity. The ruling party had paid lip service to these issues.
Piecemeal responses had included dispatching groups of university students
to undertake land title projects in rural areas, instead of supporting a credible
and systematic nationwide program of land registration as urged by interna-
tional donors.14 The government’s heavy-handed suppression of dissent over
land-grabbing was aptly symbolized by the widely condemned December
2012 jailing of Yorm Bopha, a young mother who played a leading role in
13. These are World Bank Gross National Income Per Capita (GNIPC) Atlas method ﬁgures for
2012; see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries>.
14. Informant interviews, Phnom Penh, July 2013.
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protests against the development of the Boeung Kak Lake area of Phnom
Penh by a well-connected company.15 Although King Sihamoni was asked to
pardon Yorm Bopha before the election, he was apparently prevented from
doing so by the government, a further illustration of his limited room for
maneuver. In late November, she was released on bail pending a retrial.
REGIONAL RELATIONS
In recent years, Cambodia’s regional relations have been overshadowed by an
ongoing border dispute with Thailand over the contested Preah Vihear tem-
ple complex, a dispute that degenerated intermittently into a shooting war
between 2008 and 2011. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) had ruled in
1962 that the 900-year-old temple belonged to Cambodia, but did not specify
who owned the land surrounding the historic site––which was claimed by
both sides. On November 11, 2013, the ICJ awarded Cambodia sovereignty
over the whole promontory of Preah Vihear itself, but left the two countries
to agree on who owned the adjoining area, including Phnom Trap.16 The
judgment allowed both sides to claim a measure of victory but was especially
welcomed in Phnom Penh. Hun Sen described it as ‘‘an important and
historic step forward,’’ while reaction from Bangkok was rather muted.17
There were predictable calls for ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) to help resolve the residual dispute, but it remains unclear whether
the lackluster regional body has either the requisite capacity or the political
will to make a difference.
15. For details and sources, see Free Yorm Bopha website, <http://freethe15.wordpress.com/
category/yorm-bopha/>.
16. For details of the judgment, see the ICJ press release, November 11, 2013, at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/ﬁles/151/17714.pdf>.
17. See ‘‘Partial Victory at the ICJ,’’ Phnom Penh Post, November 11, 2013, <http://www.
phnompenhpost.com/national/partial-victory-icj>.
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